24 – Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner’s Curse

24 – Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner’s Curse

We discuss auctions. We first distinguish two extremes: common values and private values. We hold a common value auction in class and discover the winner’s curse, the winner tends to overpay. We discuss why this occurs and how to avoid it: you should bid as if you knew that your bid would win; that is, as if you knew your initial estimate of the common value was the highest. This leads you to bid much below your initial estimate. Then we discuss four forms of auction: first-price sealed-bid, second-price sealed-bid, open ascending, and open descending auctions. We discuss bidding strategies in each auction form for the case when values are private. Finally, we start to discuss which auction forms generate higher revenues for the seller, but a proper analysis of this will have to await the next course.

23 – Twilight of the Polis

23 – Twilight of the Polis

In this lecture, Professor Kagan describes the growth of a new power: Thebes. Under the leadership of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, Thebes grows into a major power among the Greek cities. In fact, the Thebans even rout the Spartans in a standard hoplite battle in the battle of Leuctra. Finally, Professor Kagan points out that by the time of Theban hegemony, the Greek world had experienced so many wars and conflicts that it opened the door to a powerful leader: Philip of Macedon.

23 – Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education

23 – Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education

We look at two settings with asymmetric information; one side of a game knows something that the other side does not. We should always interpret attempts to communicate or signal such information taking into account the incentives of the person doing the signaling. In the first setting, information is verifiable. Here, the failure explicitly to reveal information can be informative, and hence verifiable information tends to come out even when you don’t want it to. We consider examples of such information unraveling. Then we move to unverifiable information. Here, it is hard to convey such information even if you want to. Nevertheless, differentially costly signals can sometimes provide incentives for agents with different information to distinguish themselves. In particular, we consider how the education system can allow future workers to signal their abilities. We discuss some implications of this rather pessimistic view of education.

22 – The Struggle for Hegemony in Fourth-Century Greece (cont.)

22 – The Struggle for Hegemony in Fourth-Century Greece (cont.)

In this lecture, Professor Kagan examines the continuation of Spartan tyranny over the Greek poleis and the response of the Greek world. According to Professor Kagan, it became clear that the Greek poleis needed to do something to check the power of Sparta. So, Thebes, Argos, Corinth, and Athens along with some of the smaller poleis joined together to fight Sparta in the Corinthian War. The war ended in a stalemate, but now the Persians were afraid of the growth of Athenian naval power. So, the king made an alliance with Sparta to bring about the King’s Peace, which emphasized Greek autonomy and which had the effect of breaking up all alliances, except the Peloponnesian League. After this fact, Sparta continued in its tyrannical behavior.

22 – Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing

22 – Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing

In business or personal relationships, promises and threats of good and bad behavior tomorrow may provide good incentives for good behavior today, but, to work, these promises and threats must be credible. In particular, they must come from equilibrium behavior tomorrow, and hence form part of a subgame perfect equilibrium today. We find that the grim strategy forms such an equilibrium provided that we are patient and the game has a high probability of continuing. We discuss what this means for the personal relationships of seniors in the class. Then we discuss less draconian punishments, and find there is a trade off between the severity of punishments and the required probability that relationships will endure. We apply this idea to a moral-hazard problem that arises with outsourcing, and find that the high wage premiums found in foreign sectors of emerging markets may be reduced as these relationships become more stable.

21 – The Struggle for Hegemony in Fourth-Century Greece

21 – The Struggle for Hegemony in Fourth-Century Greece

In this lecture, Professor Kagan describes the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War and how the Spartans began to dominate other Greek poleis, instead of liberating them. The Spartan general Lysander at this point not only grows in influence and power, but also follows an aggressive plan to establish pro-Spartan, oligarchical governments. However, according to Professor Kagan, this fact angered many cities. Therefore, Thrasybulus, along with the help of other poleis, resisted Spartan rule. Eventually he opposed Sparta at Phyle and in time reestablished the democracy of Athens.

21 – Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. the End Game

21 – Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. the End Game

We discuss repeated games, aiming to unpack the intuition that the promise of rewards and the threat of punishment in the future of a relationship can provide incentives for good behavior today. In class, we play prisoners’ dilemma twice and three times, but this fails to sustain cooperation. The problem is that, in the last stage, since there is then is future, there is no incentive to cooperate, and hence the incentives unravel from the back. We related this to the real-world problems of a lame duck leader and of maintaining incentives for those close to retirement. But it is possible to sustain good behavior in early stages of some repeated games (even if they are only played a few times) provided the stage games have two or more equilibria to be used as rewards and punishments. This may require us to play bad equilibria tomorrow. We relate this to the trade off between ex ante and ex post efficiency in the law. Finally, we play a game in which the players do not know when the game will end, and we start to consider strategies for this potentially infinitely repeated game.

20 – The Peloponnesian War, Part II (cont.)

20 – The Peloponnesian War, Part II (cont.)

In this lecture, Professor Kagan examines Pericles as a general. First, he describes Pericles’ strategy of war and then he evaluates this strategy. According to Professor Kagan, Pericles’ strategy was characterized by being both defensive and rational. It was defensive, because the Athenians did not engage the Spartans in a traditional hoplite battle, and it was rational, because Pericles assumed that the Spartans would cease fighting when they realized that the Athenians did not have to fight a land battle, since they had a walled city and a navy. On its surface, this strategy seems reasonable, but Professor Kagan points out that there were two flaws. First, the Athenians did not have an offensive plan: that is, a plan to deter the Spartans from quitting the war. Second, Pericles failed to realize that war is not always rational.

20 – Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition

20 – Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition

We first play and then analyze wars of attrition; the games that afflict trench warfare, strikes, and businesses in some competitive settings. We find long and damaging fights can occur in class in these games even when the prizes are small in relation to the accumulated costs. These could be caused by irrationality or by players’ having other goals like pride or reputation. But we argue that long, costly fights should be expected in these games even if everyone is rational and has standard goals. We show this first in a two-period version of the game and then in a potentially infinite version. There are equilibria in which the game ends fast without a fight, but there are also equilibria that can involve long fights. The only good news is that, the longer the fight and the higher the cost of fighting, the lower is the probability of such a fight.

19 – The Peloponnesian War, Part II

19 – The Peloponnesian War, Part II

In this lecture, Professor Kagan focuses on the causes of the Peloponnesian War and the possible motivations for Thucydides’ book, The History of the Peloponnesian War. Concerning the first point, Professor Kagan parts ways with Thucydides and argues that the war was not inevitable and that the Athenians under Pericles followed a policy of deterrence, which was aimed at peace. Similarly, he points out that there were a number of Spartans who did not want war as well. Therefore, according to this line of reasoning, war broke out due to a number of factors that were avoidable. Concerning the second point, Professor Kagan argues that Thucydides was a revisionist historian. In other words, Thucydides was writing not as a disinterested historian, but as a historian with a point to make, namely, that the war was inevitable and that Athens was only a democracy in name under Pericles. Finally, Professor Kagan acknowledges that his two points are debatable.