19 – Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments

19 – Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments

We analyze three games using our new solution concept, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The first game involves players’ trusting that others will not make mistakes. It has three Nash equilibria but only one is consistent with backward induction. We show the other two Nash equilibria are not subgame perfect: each fails to induce Nash in a subgame. The second game involves a matchmaker sending a couple on a date. There are three Nash equilibria in the dating subgame. We construct three corresponding subgame perfect equilibria of the whole game by rolling back each of the equilibrium payoffs from the subgame. Finally, we analyze a game in which a firm has to decide whether to invest in a machine that will reduce its costs of production. We learn that the strategic effects of this decision–its effect on the choices of other competing firms–can be large, and if we ignore them we will make mistakes.

18 – The Peloponnesian War, Part I (cont.)

18 – The Peloponnesian War, Part I (cont.)

In this lecture, Professor Kagan describes the aftermath of the Thirty Years Peace. He argues that the Peace had the potential to keep peace between Athens and Sparta due to the arbitration clause. In addition, he argues that during this time, Athens sends various diplomatic messages to the wider Greek world stating their intentions for peace, such as the Panhellenic venture to establish Thurii. However, this peace is seriously challenged when Corinth and Corcyra come into conflict over Epidamnus. At this point, Athens could make an alliance with Corcyra and run the risk of angering Sparta or allow Corinth to potentially take over Corcyra’s navy and change the naval balance of power. Athens decides on a defensive alliance.

18 – Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-Game Perfection

18 – Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-Game Perfection

We consider games that have both simultaneous and sequential components, combining ideas from before and after the midterm. We represent what a player does not know within a game using an information set: a collection of nodes among which the player cannot distinguish. This lets us define games of imperfect information; and also lets us formally define subgames. We then extend our definition of a strategy to imperfect information games, and use this to construct the normal form (the payoff matrix) of such games. A key idea here is that it is information, not time per se, that matters. We show that not all Nash equilibria of such games are equally plausible: some are inconsistent with backward induction; some involve non-Nash behavior in some (unreached) subgames. To deal with this, we introduce a more refined equilibrium notion, called sub-game perfection.

17 – The Peloponnesian War, Part I

17 – The Peloponnesian War, Part I

In this lecture, Professor Kagan describes the events that lead up the Peloponnesian War. He argues that the rise of Athenian power and the concomitant challenge to Spartan dominance pointed to potential conflict. However, Professor Kagan also points out that there were many people who did not want war and that therefore war was not inevitable. The Thirty Years Peace was negotiated, and Professor Kagan finally argues that its clause for arbitration was the key clause that could have prevented war.

17 – Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining

17 – Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining

We develop a simple model of bargaining, starting from an ultimatum game (one person makes the other a take it or leave it offer), and building up to alternating offer bargaining (where players can make counter-offers). On the way, we introduce discounting: a dollar tomorrow is worth less than a dollar today. We learn that, if players are equally patient, if offers can be in rapid succession, and if each side knows how much the game is worth to the other side, then the first offer is for an equal split of the pie and this offer is accepted. But this result depends on those assumptions; for example, bargaining power may depend on wealth.

A conversation with Chris Gondek, Trita Parsi and James Prosek

A conversation with Chris Gondek, Trita Parsi and James Prosek

In Episode 9, Chris Gondek speaks with (1) Trita Parsi about his behind-the scenes revelations about events in the Middle East and the geopolitical competition between Israel, Iran, and the United States, and with (2) James Prosek, author, watercolorist, and musician about the Yale Anglers’ Journal tenth anniversary as well as its rise as one of world’s premier literary journals devoted to the sport.

16 – Athenian Democracy (cont.)

16 – Athenian Democracy (cont.)

In this lecture, Professor Kagan continues to discuss the constitution of Athens. In particular, he explores the judicial workings of Athens. He describes in detail the effort of the Athenians to create a system of justice that would not only minimize tampering, in order to insure justice, but also maximize citizen participation. After this discussion, Professor Kagan comments on the role of women in Athens by looking at two types of sources. The picture that emerges is considerably complex and left without resolution. Finally, he comments on the role of slaves. In each of these discussions, he draws illuminating analogies to our modern society.

16 – Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels

16 – Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels

In the first half of the lecture, we consider the chain-store paradox. We discuss how to build the idea of reputation into game theory; in particular, in setting like this where a threat or promise would otherwise not be credible. The key idea is that players may not be completely certain about other players’ payoffs or even their rationality. In the second half of the lecture, we stage a duel, a game of pre-emption. The key strategic question in such games is when; in this case, when to fire. We use two ideas from earlier lectures, dominance and backward induction, to analyze the game. Finally we discuss two biases found in Americans: overconfidence and over-valuing being pro-active.

15 – Athenian Democracy

15 – Athenian Democracy

In this lecture, Professor Kagan describes the mechanics of the Delian League and its transformation into the Athenian empire. This transformation caused Athens to rival Sparta as an equal in power and prestige. He also argues that this process took place rather smoothly due to the good relations between Sparta and Athens. Professor Kagan argues that Cimon the Athenian generally played an important part in this development. Finally, Professor Kagan begins to describe the workings of Athenian democracy by comparing it with modern American democracy.

15 – Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats

15 – Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats

We first discuss Zermelo’s theorem: that games like tic-tac-toe or chess have a solution. That is, either there is a way for player 1 to force a win, or there is a way for player 1 to force a tie, or there is a way for player 2 to force a win. The proof is by induction. Then we formally define and informally discuss both perfect information and strategies in such games. This allows us to find Nash equilibria in sequential games. But we find that some Nash equilibria are inconsistent with backward induction. In particular, we discuss an example that involves a threat that is believed in an equilibrium but does not seem credible.